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ABSTRACT
Japanese official intervention in the foreign exchange market is of by far the largest magnitude in
the world, despite little or no evidence that it is effective in moving exchange rates. This paper
investigates the effectiveness of intervention using recently published Japanese official daily data
and an event study methodology. Focusing on daily Japanese and US official intervention
operations, we identify separate intervention "episodes" and analyze the subsequent effect on the
exchange rate. Using the non-parametric sign test and matched-sample test, we find strong evidence
that sterilized intervention systemically affects the exchange rate in the short-run (less than one
month). This result holds even when intervention is not associated with (simultaneous) interest rate
changes, whether or not intervention is "secret" (in the sense of no official reports or rumors of
intervention reported over the newswires), and against other robustness checks. Large-scale
(amounts over $1 billion) intervention, coordinated with the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve
working in unison, give the highest success rate
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The effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange intervention has been the focus of an ongoing and 
unresolved controversy since the Jurgensen report was published by G-10 central banks almost 
twenty years ago (Jurgensen, 1983)). In theory, sterilized intervention may be effective, working 
through portfolio balance, signaling and noise trading channels. However, empirical support for 
the effectiveness of intervention, usually based on Bundesbank and Fed intervention, is mixed 
(see Dominguez and Frankel, 1993, and Sarno and Taylor, 2001, for a recent survey of the 
literature). Nonetheless, policy makers—judging from their actions-- view sterilized intervention 
as an instrument for policy. Reviewing the empirical evidence, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) 
conclude: “In any event, governments plainly believe that sterilized intervention has its uses, for 
they continue to practice it despite the lack of any hard evidence that it is consistently and 
predictably effective” (p. 595).   
Empirical studies to date, however, have not analyzed Japanese official intervention data 
since the Ministry of Finance (MoF) did not make this publicly available until July 2001. The 
MoF now discloses, with a 1-3 month delay, the day of intervention, the amount of yen 
intervention (bought and sold by its agent, the Bank of Japan (BoJ)) and the currency of 
intervention. Whether or not sterilized intervention is effective in Japan is particularly important at 
the present juncture since, in the current zero interest rate environment, there is seemingly no 
room for additional monetary policy stimulus to support foreign exchange operations.  
More broadly, this is an important omission in our understanding over the effectiveness 
of intervention since Japan is by far the largest participant among governments in the foreign 
exchange market. As Table 1 shows, over the April 1991 - December 2000 period, the BoJ bought 
(sold) US dollars on 168 (33) occasions for a cumulative amount of $304 billion ($38 billion). 
This dwarfs all other official intervention in the foreign exchange market. For example, Japanese 
intervention was greater than US intervention over the same period by a factor of more than 30 
and is also much greater than the Bundesbank intervention operations (when Bundesbank was 
responsible for exchange rate policy in Germany).   
  4
                    
Previous studies of Japanese intervention have relied on monthly/quarterly changes in 
foreign exchange reserves and data on foreign exchange transactions from the supply and demand 
for funds in Japanese money markets (e.g. Glick and Hutchison, 1994 and 2000; Watanabe, 1994) 
or, for daily data, newspaper reports of intervention activity (Ito and Roley, 1987; Galati and 
Melick, 1999; Ramana and Amiei, 2000). As is well known, however, changes in reserves and 
newspaper reports are unreliable measures and therefore poor proxies for official intervention 
operations.  Another early paper using the newly available Japanese intervention data is a study by 
Ito (2002). He investigates the profitability of intervention, the authorities reaction function, and 
intervention effectiveness within the context of a GARCH time series model.  
The objective of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of official Japanese 
intervention operations in moving the exchange rate and whether intervention might be viewed as 
a useful policy instrument, especially in a period of interest rate inflexibility (e.g. zero interest 
rates). In order to address the issue of effectiveness, the methodological starting point of this paper 
follows Fatum and Hutchison (forthcoming) by recognizing that standard time-series techniques 
are not well suited to the analysis of intervention vis-à-vis the behavior of exchange rates. 
Exchange rates are typically highly volatile on a day-to-day basis while, on the other hand, 
intervention tends to come in sporadic clusters – viewed in this light it is perhaps not surprising 
that time-series based studies tend not to find strong evidence for a systematic link between 
exchange rate movements and intervention operations. Although standard time-series techniques 
are somewhat problematic when dealing with data on exchange rates and intervention, the event 
study approach used in the finance literature fits very well. Specifically, a cluster of intervention 
operations constitutes a natural candidate for identification as a single event (e.g. the $11 billion 
purchases of USD by the BoJ on November 29-30, 1999).
1  
 
1 The issue of endogeneity arises in our study (and every intervention study) since the central 
bank usually takes its queue to intervene on the basis of observed exchange rate movements. We 
define intervention events as a "cluster" of related days of intervention activity, the final date of 
which is essentially the manifestation of when the central bank chooses to stop intervening. This 
“endogeneity” may make intervention appear more effective. However, we argue that the 
appropriate measure of successful intervention is not the daily instantaneous impact on the  
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  In this paper we apply and extend the event study methodology developed by Fatum and 
Hutchison (and applied to Fed and Bundesbank intervention operations in the DM/USD market) 
to data on Japanese and US intervention in the USD/JPY exchange rate market over the April 1, 
1991 to December 31, 2000 period that Japanese data is available. (This defines the period of 
analysis). By construction, an event study is a very general test of a specific hypothesis and does 
not have to rely on a structural model of exchange rate determination. This is a desirable feature 
given the lack of consensus over the appropriate structural exchange rate model, but the drawback 
is that the particular channel of transmission (if intervention is effective) is not identified.  
  Using the non-parametric sign test and the matched sample test, evidence in favor of 
short-term effectiveness is presented.
2 Moreover, intervention is effective whether or not it is 
supported by interest rate changes (monetary policy) and whether or not it is “secret” or reported 
in the newswires. The results are also robust to alternative criteria for “successful” intervention, 
event definitions and event window lengths. We also find that intervention is most likely to 
succeed when it is both coordinated (BOJ and Fed) and large scale (over $1 billion) in magnitude. 
In the period of near-zero interest rates in Japan (since September 1995), however, intervention 
operations have not been coordinated and the success rate has declined.   
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data and the 
methodology. Section 3 presents the baseline event study results. Section 4 analyzes the 
effectiveness of intervention when not accompanied by policy interest rate changes and “news” 
(public announcements and newswire reports of intervention). Section 5 considers the 
effectiveness of large-scale versus small-scale intervention, coordinated versus uncoordinated 
intervention, and also changes the baseline event definition in order to perform robustness checks 
and address the issue of long-run effects of intervention. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
exchange rate while the intervention activity is ongoing, but the cumulative effect after its 
completion. Moreover, the results are not affected when the “post-event window” is expanded to 
start immediately prior to the intervention operations and end at the last day of the standard post-
event window (see section 5).  
2 Short-term refers to the two, five, ten and fifteen day post-event periods during which the 
exchange rate movement is examined.  
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2  Data and Methodology 
2.1   Data 
Total government intervention in the dollar/yen market is the sum of the Japanese government 
intervention and Fed intervention. The Japanese intervention variable is daily BoJ sales (negative 
values) and purchases (positive values) of USD (millions) against JPY in the foreign exchange 
market. The Fed intervention variable is daily Federal Reserve System sales (negative values) and 
purchases (positive values) of USD (millions) against JPY in the foreign exchange market. Both 
variables are official foreign exchange market intervention data, publicly available and provided 
by the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
respectively. 
Table 1 shows that during the sample period, April 1, 1991 to December 31, 2000, the 
BoJ intervened in the exchange rate market on a total of 201 days. The BoJ bought USD against 
JPY on 168 days and sold USD against JPY on 33 days.  On most days the magnitude of 
intervention was substantial, with trades of over USD 100 million and larger dominating (i.e. only 
13 trades of less than USD 100 million were reported). By contrast, the Fed intervened in the 
USD/JPY exchange rate market on a total of 20 days. The Fed purchased USD against JPY on 18 
days and sold USD against JPY on only 4 days. Most Fed sales of USD were small scale (less 
than USD 100 million), while Fed purchases of dollars were somewhat larger but nonetheless 
almost all under USD 500 million.  The exchange rate is the USD/JPY exchange rate, daily quote 
at noon in New York.
3  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the episodic occurrence of Japanese and US interventions in the 
USD/JPY exchange rate market, respectively, where long periods of consecutive days with no 
 
3 Both the exchange rate of the day of the event (in Tokyo) and the day after the event was 
employed in order to check the robustness of the results to time zone differences between Tokyo 
and New York. The results were not affected. We report the results with the same day exchange 
rate. The other results are available from the authors upon request.   
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intervention are separated by clusters of relatively short periods of days where intervention took 
place. Figure 3 shows the evolution of total (combined) intervention.  
 
2.2   Defining Events 
The starting point for an event study is to define the event of interest and to identify the period 
over which the security price is examined. This period is referred to as the event window and it is 
comprised of the pre-event days (sometimes referred to as the estimation window), the event day 
(or days), and the post-event days.
4 The “intervention events” need to be identified by establishing 
the event window over which the pattern of exchange rate movements is analyzed. Most events in 
finance occur only once over a given period of time. In other words, the event takes place on a 
single day.  
Defining each day that the BoJ, the Fed, or both were active in the USD/JPY exchange 
rate market as a separate event, however, is problematic since intervention frequently comes in 
“clusters”—several days in a sequence, not necessarily continuous (i.e. several days of continuous 
intervention may be separated by a few days of “tranquillity,” where no intervention occurs, 
followed by several more days of intervention). A one-day event definition would therefore lead 
to several instances of pre- and post-event windows around one-day events, during which other 
one-day events occurred (regardless of the length of the pre- and post-event windows). A 
seemingly systematic exchange rate movement around one-day events could thus be caused by 
other one-day events occurring during the pre- and post-event windows, thereby making the event 
study of little use. Furthermore, a one-day event definition does not help in structuring the data 
set, nor does it help illuminate the policy intent of intervention at a particular time. For example, 
the three continuous days of BoJ intervention on 17-19 December 1997 (during which a total of 
$8.2 billion USD were sold in support of the JPY) are naturally viewed as a single event. 
A general consideration when defining events is that, if the event period is set too short, 
then what is actually one policy episode of intervention may be incorrectly identified as two (or  
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more) events (and potentially leading to a number of overlapping event windows). On the other 
hand, if the event period is set too long, then what are actually two policy episodes – separate 
policy decisions to intervene in the foreign exchange market – may be incorrectly identified as a 
single event. Fatum and Hutchison (forthcoming) provide a detailed discussion of event study 
methodology applied to official foreign exchange market intervention.  
In this context, an event is defined as a period of days with official intervention in the 
USD/JPY exchange rate market in one direction (in terms of purchases or sales), conducted by the 
BoJ, the Fed, or both, and possibly including a number of days with no intervention. A related 
point is how many consecutive days of no intervention (the “tranquillity” period) that can be 
allowed for while still considering the surrounding days of intervention to be part of one and the 
same event. Given the structure of the intervention data, we choose a “tranquillity” period of 5 
days for our baseline results (and vary this number in the robustness checks). 
  The length of the pre-event and post-event periods, respectively, needs to be set long 
enough to capture a “normal” no intervention performance of the exchange rate. If the length of 
the periods is set too long, however, a number of instances of overlap of pre- and post-event 
windows are created. Pre- and post-event window lengths of two, five, ten and fifteen days were 
applied and the results were found to be robust to either window length. The results with two-day 
event windows are our baseline, but a summary of the results with other event window lengths is 
also presented. 
 
2.3   Defining Successful Intervention 
A final methodological issue is how to define a successful intervention episode. There is no 
convention on the definition of a successful intervention episode and, rather than relying on a 
single definition, this study follows Fatum and Hutchison (forthcoming) and applies three 
alternative criteria).  The first criterion of success is simply whether the direction of the movement 
in the exchange rate is the same as the direction in which the central bank was intervening, e.g. 
 
4 See MacKinlay (1997) for a survey on event study methodology.  
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does the value of the JPY relative to the USD increase after JPY are purchased? This measure of 
successfulness is referred to as the “direction” criterion and is formally expressed as follows: An 
event is a success if either  
 
{Ei > 0 and ∆si+ > 0} or {Ei < 0 and ∆si+ < 0} 
 
where Ei is the total amount of central bank intervention (positive values represent purchases of 
USD, negative values represent sales of USD) during event i and si+ is the JPY/USD exchange 
rate change during the associated post-event window. 
The second criterion defines a successful event as one where intervention is associated 
with a smoothing of the exchange rate movement. This criterion is formally expressed as follows: 
An event is a success according to the “smoothing” criterion if either  
 
{the event is a success according to the “direction” criterion} or 
{Ei > 0 and ∆si+ > ∆si-} or {Ei < 0 and ∆si+ < ∆si-} 
 
where si- is the JPY/USD exchange rate change during the associated pre-event window. 
The meaningfulness of both criteria, however, can be questioned if the central banks 
were to follow a “leaning with the wind” policy, i.e. if the central banks were to intervene in 
support of an ongoing exchange rate trend (formally expressed as either {Ei > 0 and ∆si- > 0} or 
{Ei < 0 and ∆si- < 0}) as opposed to “leaning against the wind” when the central banks are trying 
to slow or reverse the trend (formally expressed as either {Ei > 0 and ∆si- < 0} or {Ei < 0 and ∆si- 
> 0}).
5 For example, if the JPY is appreciating during both the pre- and the post-event window, an 
associated purchase of JPY – even if in reality completely ineffective – is deemed a success 
according to the “direction” as well as the “smoothing” criterion. Using the same example,  
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suppose the rate of change is actually smaller after the intervention event, i.e. the exchange rate 
still moves in the intended direction but at a lower pace than before the intervention occurred, it 
seems counterintuitive to denote such an event successful.  
In order to accommodate these potential shortcomings of the applied definitions the 
analysis also distinguishes between “leaning with the wind” and “leaning against the wind” events 
by conditioning each event on the exchange rate movement of the associated pre-event window.  
When the “direction” criterion is applied to “leaning against the wind” events only, the 
resulting measure of success has a clear meaning in terms of reversing the exchange rate trend that 
prevailed up until intervention occurred. This particular measure is denoted the “reversal” criteria. 
 
2.4   Test Statistics 
Two statistical tests are employed. The first test is the non-parametric sign test for the median. 
This statistic verifies whether the “directions” or the “reversals” in the direction of the exchange 
rate change following intervention events (e.g. from appreciation during the pre-event window to 
depreciation during the post-event window), or “smoothing” of the exchange rate change 
following intervention events (e.g. smaller appreciation) are random or systematic. The sign test 
for the median is applicable to any continuous distribution and the null hypothesis is that the 
population corresponding to the sample has a median value equal to zero against the alternative 
that the median is larger than zero. 
  With reference to the “direction” and “reversal” criteria for success, if the hypothesis is 
true, the probability ρ of observing a positive value (“success”) is the same as that of observing a 
negative value (“no-success”), hence µ = 0.5. In other words, the random variable X (equal to the 
number of positive values or “successes”) among n sample observations has a binomial 
distribution with µ = 0.5. A significant sign test indicates that the observed number of successes is 
 
5 Since the motivation for central bank intervention is rarely announced, the policy criteria 
“leaning against” and “leaning with” the wind are only indicative of actual policy intentions.  
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not a random finding attributable to the equal probability of appreciation or depreciation. For 
details on this test in event studies, see MacKinlay (1997).
6 
  The second test is the matched sample test (see, for example, Ben-Horim and Levy, 
1984, p. 458). This one verifies whether there is a significant shift in the exchange rate change 
between the pre- and the post-event periods. Since it is straightforward to match the observations 
of one sample (before) with the observations of the second sample (after), the matched sample test 
can be applied to the event study set-up. The matched sample test is identified with the 
“smoothing” criterion since it indicates, at the minimum, smaller JPY appreciation or 
depreciation. 
 
3  The Results of the Event Study 
Focusing first on the two-day pre- and post-event window definitions (and the maximum 5-day 
“tranquillity” period), Table 2 identifies 43 intervention events over the 10-year period. The table 
provides a detailed description of the behavior of the USD/JPY exchange rate during the pre- and 
post-event windows, the total amount (and direction) of the intervention for each event, and the 
number of days of intervention during the events. 
  The BoJ, the Fed, or both intervened in the USD/JPY exchange rate market on 43 
separate events, and 28 of these cases consisted of multiple days of intervention operations. 
Comparing the direction of intervention during the event with the change in the exchange rate 
over the preceding period, the two-day pre-event window, 34 events appear consistent with a 
“leaning against the wind” intervention policy and, accordingly, nine events appear in line with 
“leaning with the wind”. 
  Turning to the successfulness of the defined events, it is immediately apparent that the 
direction of the change in the exchange rate during the post-event window was consistent with the 
direction of the associated intervention in 31 events. In other words, 31 of the 43 events were 
 
6 Despite the usefulness of the non-parametric rank test in event studies, see MacKinley (1997) 
and Campbell and Wasley (1993) for details, the relatively small number of events in our samples  
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successful according to the “direction” criterion. Furthermore, 24 of the 34 “leaning against the 
wind” events were successful according to the “reversal” criterion while 29 of the 34 “leaning 
against the wind” events were successful according to the “smoothing” criterion. 
 
3.1  Sign Test Results 
Table 3 displays the results from the sign test based on the “direction”, the “reversal”, and the 
“smoothing” criterion for successfulness of an event. For the case of the “direction” criterion, the 
table divides the 43 events into USD purchases (29 events) and sales (14 events). 22 of the 29 
events of USD purchases were successful thus rejecting randomness at the 99 percent significance 
level. Only 9 of the 14 events of JPY sales were successful - thus the exchange rate movements 
subsequent to the intervention operations appeared to be random. Without distinguishing between 
purchases and sales of USD, 31 of the 43 events were successful, rejecting randomness at the 99 
percent significance level. 
  Based on the “reversal” criterion, and thus the sub-set of events associated with a 
“leaning against the wind” policy, 17 of the 23 events of USD purchases when the USD had been 
depreciating were successful, rejecting randomness at the 95 percent significance level. 7 of the 
11 events of USD sales when the USD was appreciating were successful, so that randomness 
could not be rejected. Accordingly, 24 of the 34 events of either USD sales or purchases were 
successful thus rejecting randomness at close to the 99 percent significance level. 
  Finally, the sign test based on successfulness according to the “smoothing” definition 
finds that 20 (9) of the 23 (11) events of USD purchases (sales) associated with a “leaning against 
the wind” policy were successful, but that randomness could not be rejected at conventional 
significance levels (based on a binominal distribution with the probability of an individual success 
of 75%). Randomness could also not be rejected for purchases and sales taken together, despite 
the fact that 29 of the 34 “leaning against the wind” events were successful. 
 
precludes this test.   
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As an illustration of the findings being robust to pre- and post-event window lengths 
other than two days, Table 4 provides a comparison of the sign test results based on window 
lengths of two and five days.
7 (The rows identified with “excl. interest rate changes” are discussed 
in the next section). The results with 5-day windows are stronger than with 2-day windows. With 
respect to every criterion of success, randomness was rejected at the 99 percent significance level 
using the 5-day event window. Over a period of 5 days, the success of intervention operations is 
striking. In particular, it is noteworthy that the “smoothing” criterion is also met for intervention 
success with the 5-day event window.  
Summarizing the findings of this part of the analysis, the null hypothesis of no link 
between the intervention events and the subsequent short run exchange rate movements is clearly 
rejected. These results are robust to changes in the length of the pre- and post-event windows and 
the criteria for success applied as well as to exclusion of  “leaning with the wind” observations 
from the sample. 
 
3.2  Matched Sample Test Results 
Table 5 presents the results of the matched sample test of the “smoothing” criteria for intervention 
success. Before (after) the intervention events when the two authorities (BoJ and Fed) purchased 
USD in the foreign exchange market the average exchange rate change was 0.84 (-0.28).
8 Before 
(after) the intervention events when the two central banks sold USD in the foreign exchange 
market the average exchange rate change was -0.32 (0.26). Events of “leaning against the wind” 
intervention in the USD/JPY exchange rate were, on average, associated with a reversal of the 
preceding trend. Formally, both cases strongly reject (at the 95 percent significance level or 
higher) the null hypothesis of no difference in means – that is, intervention appears to have had a 
smoothing effect on exchange rate changes. 
 
7 Longer window lengths are problematic as expanding the window length beyond the maximum 
allowed “tranquillity” days creates several overlaps of pre-and post-event windows.  
8 Focusing on the events associated with a “leaning against the wind” policy.  
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  The applied matched sample test, as already noted, assumes normality in the underlying 
distribution of pre- and post-event window exchange rate changes. There is substantial evidence, 
however, that exchange rates exhibit a high degree of kurtosis (“fat tails”). This implies that the 
normality assumption would lead to a bias towards rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference 
in mean values. To address this concern, we regress our sample of leaning against the window 
“matched pair” differences (for both USD sales and USD purchases) on a constant term using 
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent (robust) standard errors. The estimated constant term 
for the differences in matched pairs USD sales (USD purchases) regression is the same as the 
mean values reported in Table 5, of course, and the p-value is 0.01% (0.00%). These results are 
thus consistent with the matched sample tests reported in Table 5.  
 
4  Intervention Success and “News”  
Up to this point, exchange rate movements during the post-event windows are implicitly attributed 
to central bank intervention and no controls are made for the arrival of other economic news or 
policies. That is, the event study methodology assumes that intervention defines the event and is 
not systematically linked to other relevant economic news or developments such as monetary 
policy shifts. In principle, this is an issue arising in all event studies but is a greater concern in 
cases such as ours where the event may be drawn out over several days.  
  In this context, changes in interest rate policy and formal announcements that the BoJ 
has intervened would seemingly be the most likely economic developments systemically related to 
intervention policy. The former “news” is especially relevant under present conditions-- if 
seemingly successful interventions in Japan were in reality attributable to simultaneous and 
supporting interest rate changes, this channel is now cut off (on the downward side) with the zero 
interest rate policy. Under these circumstances, intervention may not be effective. (Intervention 
with simultaneous interest rate changes may be interpreted as unsterilized intervention).  The 
second point is also of interest, however. Is “secret” intervention (e.g. no official reports or  
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rumours of intervention over the newswires) as effective as reported intervention operations in 
moving the exchange rate? 
 
4. 1   Interest Rate “News” 
To address the first point, we investigate in table 6 the way short-term interest rates controlled by 
the Fed and the Bank of Japan are correlated with our intervention events. 6 events in our 
combined intervention (Fed and the Bank of Japan) sample were also associated with interest rate 
changes by either the Fed or the BoJ at some point during the sample period. The second column 
shows the interest rate changes during each event (JPD indicates discount rate changes by the BoJ; 
FF denotes Federal Funds rate changes by the Federal Reserve).  The third column shows the 
amount of intervention during the event (positive values indicate purchases of USD against JPY 
by either the Fed or BoJ). The fourth column shows the date of the interest rate change and the 
last column indicates whether the interest rate change is in a direction consistent with the 
intervention operation during the event.  
  This analysis indicates that only half of the interest rate changes are consistent with the 
intervention operations during the event period. For example, the $10.9 billion USD purchases 
(sales of JPY) on September 6-8, 1995 were consistent, in the sense of an attempt to weaken the 
value of the yen in the foreign exchange market, with the 50 basis point decline in the Bank of 
Japan’s discount rate on September 8. On the other hand, the BoJ discount rate drop on July 27, 
1992 was not consistent with the $374 million USD dollar sales (JPY purchases) on the foreign 
exchange market.  
  To isolate the effect of intervention alone (i.e. without interest rate changes), we 
separate out those events during which no interest rate changes took place. This provides a sub-
sample of 37 "pure" intervention policy events. These results, reported in table 4 (denoted by 
“excl. interest rate changes”), also support the hypothesis that intervention events are associated 
with significant exchange rate changes. The results are almost identical to the tests where interest 
rate changes are included (although with fewer degrees of freedom, statistical significance is  
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lowered slightly). Intervention is again significant at conventional levels in every case except in 
the case of the “smoothing” criteria with 2-day windows. Whether the interest rate changes are 
included or not does not materially change the results. 
  These results indicate that, at least in the very short run, intervention policy is effective 
in moving the exchange rate without supporting interest rate changes. Intervention may not be an 
alternative to an effective monetary policy since there is only evidence (in our event study) of 
effectiveness over a horizon measured in terms of the number of days, not weeks or months. 
Nonetheless, intervention would appear to be effective in moving the exchange rate in the present 
circumstances - as the BoJ follows a zero-interest rate policy.  This is consistent with Svensson’s 
(2001) proposal that the BoJ make an aggressive move to depreciate the exchange rate in attempt 
to counteract price deflation and recession.  
 
4.2    News reports of intervention: Is “secret” intervention effective? 
We also investigated the extent to which intervention reported by the authorities, or market 
rumors of intervention, are responsible for the evidence of intervention’s effectiveness in moving 
exchange rates. We conduct event studies excluding intervention news, and are able to address 
whether “secret” intervention is effective. News reports were gleaned from the Wall Street Journal 
(from previous day Reuters newswire reports), and dated to reflect the day the news was available 
to the market. 
  Table 7 shows the basic event study methodology, for both 2- and 5-day windows, 
where events are excluded if intervention “news” was reported simultaneously. The two types of 
intervention news that would exclude an event are reported intervention as well as “rumours” of 
intervention. In this sense, the event study in table 7 shows the effects of “secret” intervention. A 
very high percentage of the events reported in table 7 are “successful” but statistical power is low 
due to the reduced degrees of freedom. For example, we excluded (due the simultaneous news) 34 
of the 43 events in the “direction” test, leaving only 9 events in the sample. 7 of the 9 events were  
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successful using 2-day windows according to the direction criterion (78% success rate), but this is 
only significant at the 90% level of confidence due to the small number of observations.  
  Looking across the three tests, two types of news categories, and two window 
definitions, we observe that intervention was successful in 67% to 100% of the events. This 
number is similar to the results when “news” events were not excluded. However, the p-values 
range from 1.95% to 84.38% due to the low degrees of freedom. On balance, given the low power 
of the tests, formal statistical tests may not accurately reflect the relative success of “secret” 
intervention operations. Reports and rumors of intervention usually accompanied actual 
intervention operations in Japan, making it difficult to disentangle the relative efficacy of open 
and secret intervention operations.  
 
5   Large-scale and Coordinated Intervention, Robustness and Long Run Effects  
5.1 Coordinated Intervention and Magnitude Effects 
  It is reasonable to assume that coordinated (BoJ and Fed) and/or large scale official 
foreign exchange market intervention operations are likely to have a high probability of success 
than other forms of intervention. To address the first point, we divide the 43 events into those that 
were coordinated between the BoJ and the Fed and those that were not (unilateral intervention 
operations). 12 of the 14 coordinated intervention operations were successful in moving the 
exchange rate in the desired direction (using the standard 2-day window and direction criterion for 
success), giving a p-value of 0.65 percent. By contrast, 19 of the 29 uncoordinated events were 
successful (p=6.80 percent). (This compares with 31 successes out of 43 events overall). The 
results indicate the probability of success is much higher when the BoJ and the Fed work together 
in coordinating their intervention operations in the foreign exchange market.
9   
  Large-scale intervention operations are also more effective than small-scale operations. 
Dividing the sample into intervention operations larger than $1 billion USD (31 events) and less  
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than $1 billion USD (12 events) give rough measures of “large” and “small” scale. 23 of the 31 
large-scale intervention events were successful (p=0.53 percent), compared with 8 of the 12 small-
scale intervention events (p=19.38 percent).  
  Finally, we investigate whether large-scale coordinated events are the most successful. 
Using the same definitions as above, we find 12 of the events were both large-scale and 
coordinated by the BoJ and the Fed and that 11 of these events were successful (p= 0.32 percent). 
Ninety-two percent of the events were successful in moving the exchange rate in the desired 
direction when both the BoJ and the Fed were involved, and intervened with substantial amounts 
of foreign exchange. By contrast, only 8 of the 12 events that were both small-scale and 
uncoordinated were successful (p=19.38 percent). Uncoordinated small-scale intervention does 
not appear to be a useful policy.  
 
5.2 Robustness Checks: Event Length, Window Length and Endogeneity  
A natural question that arises is whether the results are robust to changes in the length of 
the event. That is, do short events have different effects than long events in terms of the number of 
business days that the central bank is actively intervening in the foreign exchange market? To 
address this issue, we divide the events into “short” (no more than five business days) and “long” 
(longer than five business days) events. 31 (12) of the events are classified as short (long) in 
duration. Using our baseline model and the direction test, we find that 22 of 31 short events (9 of 
12 long events) are successful with a p-value of 1.47 percent (7.30 percent). Both short- and long-
duration events are successful-- the results are not affected by the number of business days that 
the central bank decides to intervene in the foreign exchange market.  
The analysis to this point is based on an event definition where intervention operations 
separated by more than 5 consecutive days of no intervention were considered part of different 
events (the 5-day “tranquillity” definition). In order to check the robustness of the previous results 
   
9 This finding appears consistent with Fatum (2002) who, using a logit model framework, shows 
that intervention in the USD/DEM exchange rate is more likely to be successful when both the  
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we now apply an alternative event definition where intervention operations separated by as many 
as 15 consecutive days of no intervention are still considered part of the same event (a 15-day 
“tranquillity” definition). Allowing for 15 consecutive days of no intervention in our event 
definition reduces the number of events in the sample, thereby lowering the power of the sign test 
and, therefore, makes the null hypothesis of ineffectiveness harder to reject. Furthermore, this 
alternative event definition allows for an extension of the pre- and post-event windows to span 15 
days without the post-event (pre-event) window of one event coinciding with intervention 
operations of the subsequent (previous) event. 
  Table 8 shows the sign test results for four different window lengths – 2, 5, 10 and 15 
day window lengths - based on the alternative 15 day “tranquillity” definition. With respect to the 
“direction” criterion, randomness was rejected at the 99 percent significance level for all four 
window lengths while randomness was rejected at the 95 percent significance level or better when 
focusing on the “reversal” as well as the “smoothing” criterion. Despite the lower number of 
events, the previous findings are strongly robust to changes in the event definition. 
  Finally, the issue of endogeneity was raised earlier in the article: Is intervention really 
successful or is it simply the case that the central bank continues to intervene until the exchange 
rate turns in the favorable direction and then it stops intervening? Standard event studies look at 
the asset price level or change during the post-event window, compared to the pre-event window. 
However, in our study events typically last several days, so that endogenity of the event (after the 
initial intervention) may become an issue. To see if our results are changed by events with 
multiple days of intervention operations, we expand the post-event window to include the event 
itself and measure the exchange rate change from the start of intervention through the end of the 
five-day post-event window. Using this modified post-event window (and the standard direction 
test), we find that 28 of the 43 events are successful with a p-value of 3.3 percent. (26 of the 43 
events are successful using a two-day post event window combined with the event period). Events 
with multiple days don’t qualitatively affect the results. Measured from the point of intervention 
 
Fed and the Bundesbank are in the market.  
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to the end of the post-event window, central bank intervention moves the exchange rate in the 
direction intended.  
 
5.3 How long lasting is the effectiveness of intervention? 
  Our criteria for a successful event focus on the short run, i.e. the two to five day windows 
before and after each event when using the 5-day tranquillity definition and the two to fifteen day 
windows before and after when using the 15-day tranquillity definition. Beyond the 15-day 
window length, we have not addressed the question of whether intervention events appear to have 
any lasting effect. In order to address this question, we use the 15-day “tranquillity” event 
definition and extend the pre- and post event windows of our event study set-up to span 30 days. 
  “Long run” success is thus defined as an average exchange rate movement over a period 
of 30-days following, and consistent with, the associated intervention event. Extending the 
analysis to encompass this long of an event window comes at a cost, however, since a number of 
the intervention events are necessarily excluded due to the overlap of post-event windows and 
subsequent events. Furthermore, the longer the event window the more likely that other news may 
influence exchange rate developments. Nonetheless, using the 30-day window and again applying 
the sign test to the three criteria of success (direction, reversal or smoothing), we can no longer 
reject the null hypothesis (no effect). In particular, the number of successful events does not 
exceed the 90 percent confidence level for any of the 9 tests (three criteria of success applied to all 
events, purchases of USD only and sales of USD only). Although these “long run” results should 
be interpreted with caution due to the limited sample size, it is clear that evidence in support of 
effective intervention is absent when the window-lengths are extended to 30 days. 
 
6   Conclusion 
Japanese official intervention in the foreign exchange market is by far the largest magnitude in the 
world, despite little or no evidence that it is effective in moving exchange rates. Up until recently, 
however, official data on intervention has not been available for Japan. This paper investigates the  
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effectiveness of intervention using recently published official daily data and an event study 
methodology. The event study better fits the stochastic properties of intervention and exchange 
rate data, i.e. intense and sporadic bursts of intervention activity juxtaposed against a yen/dollar 
rate continuously changing, than standard time-series approaches.  
  Focusing on daily Japanese and US official intervention operations, we identify separate 
intervention “episodes” and analyze the subsequent effect on the exchange rate. Using the non-
parametric sign test and matched-sample test, we find strong evidence that sterilized intervention 
systemically affects the exchange rate in the short-run. This result holds even when intervention is 
not associated with (simultaneous) interest rate changes and regardless of whether or not 
intervention is “secret” (in the sense of no official reports or rumors of intervention reported over 
the newswires). Controlling for endogenity (when the central bank intervenes for multiple days 
during a single event) also does not affect the results. Large-scale intervention operations 
characterized by the simultaneous presence in the foreign exchange market by both the Bank of 
Japan and the Federal Reserve gave by far the highest likelihood of success. Over ninety percent 
of the interventions of this form (large scale and coordinated) were successful in our data sample. 
  Intervention was also found to be effective even if not accompanied by supporting 
interest rate changes. This is relevant for present circumstances in Japan where the Bank of Japan 
is following a zero interest rate policy and there is no room to lower interest rates further. This 
result suggests that the Bank of Japan could indeed engineer exchange rate depreciation (thereby 
counteracting deflation and recession) even though interest rates cannot be moved further 
downwards. However, only one of the fifteen BoJ intervention episodes has been coordinated 
with the Fed since September 1995 (when Japanese interest rates reach 0.50 percent and 
subsequently fell to zero). This may explain why the success rate for intervention events has not 
been high during this period (only 9 successful intervention for a success rate of 60 percent). 
Under these circumstances, it would appear that only persistent, large-scale and coordinated 
intervention (Bank of Bank and the Federal Reserve) would seem likely to effect a sustained 
movement in the exchange rate.  
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  In interpreting the results two caveats should be noted. First, we only find support for 
short-run effectiveness of intervention. The baseline results found intervention events to be 
effective over a period of 2-5 days, and an extension of the framework showed effects lasting for 
up to two weeks. This is not direct evidence against longer-term effects, but reflects a limitation of 
the event study methodology. Second, the event-study methodology does not allow identification 
of the particular channel through which intervention works. Our findings are consistent, however, 
with recent literature interpreting intervention as a means to "signal" not only future policy but 
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Table 1    Fed and BoJ Intervention in the USD/JPY Exchange Rate Market 
 
Bank of Japan Intervention, April 1, 1991 – December 31, 2000 
 
Purchases of USD (million USD)    Number of Days           Cumulated Amount 
 
>5000a              13                 100,435 
>1000b              37                 144,825 
>  500c               30                   28,618 
>  100d               79                   22,948 
>      0e                9                        713 
Total Purchases          168                  303,985 
 
Sales of USD (million USD) 
 
>5000a               2                 -25,757 
>1000b               3                   -5,390 
>  500c               4                   -2,295 
>  100d             20                   -4,043 
>      0e               4                      -273 
Total Sales           33                 -37,758 
 
 
Fed Intervention, April 1, 1991 – December 31, 2000. 
 
Purchases of USD (million USD)    Number of Days           Cumulated Amount 
 
>5000a                0                            0 
>1000b                0                            0 
>  500c                 3                     2,160 
>  100d               15                     5,184 
>      0e                0                            0 
Total Purchases            18                     7,344 
 
  Sales of USD (million USD) 
 
>5000a                0                           0 
>1000b                0                           0 
>  500c                1                      -833 
>  100d                0                           0 
>      0e                3                      -200 
Total Sales              4                   -1.033 
 
a) Daily intervention operations of USD 5000 million or greater. 
b) Daily intervention operations of USD 1000 million or greater, but less than USD 5000 million. 
c) Daily intervention operations of USD 500 million or greater, but less than USD 1000 million. 
d) Daily intervention operations of USD 100 million or greater, but less than USD 500 million. 
e) Daily intervention operations of less than USD 100 million. 
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Table 2   Total Intervention in the USD/JPY Exchange Rate Market    
        (5-day “tranquillity” definition, 2-day window length) 
 
Date of event  Avg. daily % 






Total amount of 
intervention (b) 
(millions of USD) 
Number of days of 
intervention during 
event 
Avg. daily % change 
in the USD/JPY 
exchange rate over 
subsequent 2 days 
(c) 
May 13, 91 
Jun 10, 91 – Jun 13, 91 
Aug 19, 91 
Jan 17, 92 
Feb 17, 92 – Feb 20, 92 
Mar 4, 92 – Mar 11, 92 
Apr 1, 92 
Apr 27, 92 – Apr 30, 92 
May 22, 92 – Jun 25, 92 
Jul 24, 92 –Jul 27, 92 
Aug 7, 92 – Aug 11, 92 
Apr 2, 93 – May 7, 93 
May 26, 93 – Jun 15, 93 
Jun 28, 93 
Jul 30, 93 – Sep 7, 93 
Feb 15, 94 – Mar 4, 94 
Mar 29, 94 – May 4, 94 
Jun 20, 94 – Jul 12, 94 
Aug 18, 94 – Aug 25, 94 
Sep 6, 94 – Sep 20, 94 
Oct 3, 94 
Oct 14, 94 – Nov 3, 94 
Feb 17, 95 – Apr 18, 95 
May 31, 95 
Jun 28, 95 – Jul 7, 95 
Aug 2, 95  
Aug 11, 95 – Aug 15, 95 
Sep 6, 95 – Sep 8, 95 
Sep 22, 95 
Feb 20, 96 – Feb 27, 96 
Dec 17, 97 – Dec 19, 97 
Apr 9, 98 – Apr 10, 98 
Jun 17, 98 
Jan 12, 99 
Jun 10, 99 – Jun 21, 99 
Jul 5, 95 
Jul 20, 99 – Jul 21, 99 
Sep 10, 99 – Sep 14, 99 
Nov 29, 99 – Nov 30, 99 
Dec 24, 99 
Jan 4, 00 
Mar 8, 00 – Mar 15, 00 













































































































































































a)  Average daily percentage change in the USD/JPY exchange rate over the two business days prior to first day of the 
event. 
b)  Positive values represent intervention in support of the USD, i.e. purchase of USD, while negative values represent 
intervention aimed at reducing the value of the USD, i.e. sale of USD. 
c)  Average percentage change in the USD/JPY exchange rate over the 2 business days succeeding the last day of the 
event.  
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Table 3  Total Intervention in the USD/JPY Exchange Rate Market 
 (5-day "tranquillity" definition and 2-day event windows) 
    
Non-parametric sign test of "direction"  
    
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (a)  P-value (b) 
        
USD Purchases  29  22  0.41% 
        
USD Sales    14  9  21.20% 
        
Total USD Purchases and Sales  43  31  0.27% 
    
        
    
Non-parametric sign test of "reversal"  
    
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (a)  P-value (b) 
        
USD Purchases when USD Depreciates (c)  23  17  1.73% 
        
USD Sales when USD Appreciates (c)  11  7  27.44% 
        
Total USD Sales and Purchases (c)  34  24  1.22% 
    
        
    
Non-parametric sign test of "smoothing"  
    
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (d)  P-value (e) 
        
USD Purchases when USD Depreciates (c)  23  20  13.70% 
        
USD Sales when USD Appreciates (c)  11  9  45.52% 
        
Total USD Sales and Purchases (c)  34  29  11.38% 
    
    
a. Intervention is successful if the sale (purchase) of USD is associated with USD depreciation 
    (appreciation) measured as the average of the exchange rate changes over subsequent 2-day period. 
b. Based on a binomial probability distribution with the probability of an individual success of 50 %. 
c. The Bank of Japan and the Fed pursuing a "leaning against the wind" intervention policy. 
d. Intervention is successful if the sale (purchase) of USD is associated with USD depreciation 
    (appreciation) or slowing of USD appreciation (depreciation). 
e. Based on a binomial probability distribution with the probability of an individual success of 75 %. 
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Table 4   Total Intervention in the USD/JPY Exchange Rate Market: 
   5-day "tranquillity" definition, different window lengths and excluding  
   events coinciding with interest rate changes 
    
Non-parametric sign test of "direction"  
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (a)  P-value (b) 
        
2-day windows  43  31  0.27% 
        
5-day windows  43  31  0.27% 
        
2-day windows; excl. interest rate changes  37  26  1.00% 
        
5-day windows; excl. interest rate changes  37  25  2.35% 
        
        
Non-parametric sign test of "reversal"  
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (a)  P-value (b) 
        
2-day windows (c)  34  24  1.22% 
        
5-day windows (c)  36  26  0.57% 
        
2-day windows; excl. interest rate changes (c)  30  21  2.14% 
        
5-day windows; excl. interest rate changes (c)  32  22  2.51% 
    
    
Non-parametric sign test of "smoothing"  
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (d)  P-value (e) 
        
2-day windows (c)  34  29  11.38% 
        
5-day windows (c)  36  35  0.04% 
        
2-day windows; excl. interest rate changes (c)  30  25  20.26% 
        
5-day windows; excl. interest rate changes (c)  32  31  0.12% 
    
a. Intervention is successful if the sale (purchase) of USD is associated with USD depreciation 
    (appreciation) measured as the average of the exchange rate changes over subsequent period. 
b. Based on a binomial probability distribution with the probability of an individual success of 50 %. 
c. The Bank of Japan and the Fed pursuing a "leaning against the wind" intervention policy. 
d. Intervention is successful if the sale (purchase) of USD is associated with USD depreciation 
    (appreciation) or slowing of USD appreciation (depreciation). 
e. Based on a binomial probability distribution with the probability of an individual success of 75 %.  
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Table 5   Total Intervention in the USD/JPY Exchange Rate Market 
   (5-day "tranquillity" definition and 2-day event windows) 
    
    
Matched sample test of "smoothing"  
    
   Number  of    t-statistic 
   Events   (a) 
        
USD Purchases  29   
        
     Difference in means    -0.91  -32.61 
        
USD Purchases when USD Depreciates (b)  23   
        
     Prior event average percentage change (c)    0.84   
        
     Post event average percentage change (c)    -0.28   
        
     Difference in means    -1.12  -32.91 
        
        
USD Sales    14   
        
     Difference in means    0.50  9.30 
        
USD Sales when USD Appreciates (b)  11   
        
     Prior event average percentage change (c)    -0.32   
        
     Post event average percentage change (c)    0.26   
        
     Difference in means    0.58  9.29 
        
        
a. Matched sample (paired comparison) of exchange rate growth rate changes prior and 
    post of each event, assuming both series are normally distributed.   
b. The Bank of Japan and the Fed pursuing a "leaning against the wind" intervention policy. 
c. The average of the average daily percentage change in the exchange rate over preceding 











Table 6               Interest Rate Changes During Events 
     (5-day “tranquillity” definition)   
   
Date of event 
 










Apr 1, 92 
Jul 24, 92 – Jul 27, 92 
Mar 29, 94 – May 4, 94 
Feb 17, 95 – Apr 18, 95 
Jun 28, 95 – Jul 7, 95 
















Apr 1, 92 
Jul 27, 92 
Apr 18, 94 
Apr 14, 95 
Jul 6, 95 









a)  Positive values represent intervention in support of the USD, i.e. purchase of USD, 
while negative values represent intervention aimed at reducing the USD, i.e. sale of 
USD. 
b)  The direction of the intervention operation is consistent with the direction of the 
interest rate change, e.g. a purchase of USD is consistent with a rise in the Federal 



































Table 7   Total Intervention in the USD/JPY Exchange Rate Market: 
   5-day “tranquillity” definition, different window lengths and excluding  
   events coinciding with WSJ reports and rumours of intervention 
    
Non-parametric sign test of "direction"  
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (a)  P-value (b) 
        
2-day windows; excl. reported events  9  7  8.98% 
        
5-day windows; excl. reported events  9  8  1.95% 
        
2-day windows; excl. reported and rumored events  5  4  18.75% 
        
5-day windows; excl. reported and rumored events  5  4  18.75% 
        
    
Non-parametric sign test of "reversal"  
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (a)  P-value (b) 
        
2-day windows; excl. reported events  7  5  22.66% 
        
5-day windows; excl. reported events  7  6  6.25% 
        
2-day windows; excl. reported and rumored events  3  2  50.00% 
        
5-day windows; excl. reported and rumored events  3  2  50.00% 
    
    
Non-parametric sign test of "smoothing"  
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (d)  P-value (e) 
        
2-day windows; excl. reported events  7  6  44.49% 
        
5-day windows; excl. reported events  7  7  13.35% 
        
2-day windows; excl. reported and rumored events  3  2  84.38% 
        
5-day windows; excl. reported and rumored events  3  3  42.19% 
    
a. Intervention is successful if the sale (purchase) of USD is associated with USD depreciation 
    (appreciation) measured as the average of the exchange rate changes over subsequent period. 
b. Based on a binomial probability distribution with the probability of an individual success of 50 %. 
c. The Bank of Japan and the Fed pursuing a "leaning against the wind" intervention policy. 
d. Intervention is successful if the sale (purchase) of USD is associated with USD depreciation 
    (appreciation) or slowing of USD appreciation (depreciation).   
e. Based on a binomial probability distribution with the probability of an individual success of 75 %.  
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Table 8   Total Intervention in the USD/JPY Exchange Rate Market: 
   15-day "tranquillity" definition and different window lengths 
    
    
Non-parametric sign test of "direction"  
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (a)  P-value (b) 
        
2-day window definition  27  21  0.30% 
        
5-day window definition  27  20  0.96% 
        
10-day window definition  27  20  0.96% 
        
15-day window definition  27  20  0.96% 
        
    
Non-parametric sign test of "reversal"  
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (a)  P-value (b) 
        
2-day window definition (c)  22  18  0.22% 
        
5-day window definition (c)  25  18  2.16% 
        
10-day window definition (c)  26  19  1.45% 
        
15-day window definition (c)  24  17  3.20% 
    
    
Non-parametric sign test of "smoothing"  
    Number of  Number of    
    Events  Successes (d)  P-value (e) 
        
2-day window definition (c)  22  21  1.49% 
        
5-day window definition (c)  25  23  3.21% 
        
10-day window definition (c)  26  24  2.58% 
        
15-day window definition (c)  24  22  3.98% 
    
a. Intervention is successful if the sale (purchase) of USD is associated with USD depreciation 
    (appreciation) measured as the average of the exchange rate changes over subsequent period. 
b. Based on a binomial probability distribution with the probability of an individual success of 50 %. 
c. The Bank of Japan and the Fed pursuing a "leaning against the wind" intervention policy. 
d. Intervention is successful if the sale (purchase) of USD is associated with USD depreciation 
    (appreciation) or slowing of USD appreciation (depreciation). 
e. Based on a binomial probability distribution with the probability of an individual success of 75 %.  
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